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ABSTRACT 
The Timber Regulation is the EU’s latest addition to its regulatory framework on 
forestry governance. This paper begins with an overview of the substantive provisions 
of the Regulation and then briefly addresses two comparable initiatives: the American 
Lacey Act and the Australian Illegal Logging Prohibition Bill. The second part of the 
paper focuses extensively on the WTO consistency of the Regulation, based on an 
analysis of Articles XI, III, and I GATT. In the view of the authors, although the EU 
Timber Regulation is likely to violate at least one substantive WTO provision, it is 
probably justifiable on the basis of Article XX GATT. The approach taken in the 
Timber Regulation may serve the EU in achieving non-trade objectives by restricting 
access to its market. 
 
KEY WORDS 
World Trade Organization, WTO, GATT, TBT, consistency, European Union Timber 
Regulation, illegal logging, legality verification 
 
AUTHORS 
Dylan Geraets is a PhD researcher at the Leuven Centre for Global Governance 
Studies (KU Leuven). 
Bregt Natens is a PhD researcher at the Leuven Centre for Global Governance 
Studies (KU Leuven). 
 
ADDRESS FOR CORRESPONDENCE 
Dylan.Geraets@law.kuleuven.be  
Bregt.Natens@ggs.kuleuven.be  
 
© 2013 by Dylan Geraets and Bregt Natens. All rights reserved. No portion of this 
paper may be reproduced without permission of the authors.  
Working papers are research materials circulated by their authors for purposes of 
information and critical discussion. They have not necessarily undergone formal peer 
review.  
 
 
 
 
  
2 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
I. Introduction ........................................................................................................ 1 
 
II. Combatting trade in illegal timber in the European Union, the United States 
and Australia ............................................................................................................. 2 
A. European Union: the two pillars of the FLEGT Action Plan ............................... 2 
B. United States: Lacey Act .................................................................................. 5 
C. Australia: Illegal Logging Prohibition Bill ........................................................... 6 
 
III. The WTO-consistency of EU Regulation 995/2010 ............................................ 8 
A. Trade effects of the Timber Regulation: concerns raised in the WTO ............... 8 
B. Substantive analysis ....................................................................................... 10 
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ........................................... 10 
(a) Article XI GATT .................................................................................... 10 
(b) Article III GATT .................................................................................... 11 
(c) Article I GATT ...................................................................................... 15 
(d) Article XX GATT .................................................................................. 16 
2. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade .................................................. 23 
 
IV. Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 25 
 
1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
On 3 March 2013, Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 (Timber Regulation) entered into 
force.1 It aims at preventing the introduction of illegally logged into the market of the 
European Union (EU). The EU has been active in the fight against illegal logging for 
over a decade and the Timber Regulation is the latest step in the EU’s efforts to put a 
halt to illegal logging practices. Already in 2003, the European Commission developed 
the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance, and Trade (FLEGT) Action Plan.2 The 
Timber Regulation is to become the pinnacle in the execution of the Action Plan.  
 
Illegal logging may be understood narrowly as harvesting timber without the required 
permits or in violation of granted permits. More broadly, it covers a wide range of 
illegal activities including harvesting, transport, processing and trade of timber, and 
evasion of fees and taxes related thereto, which have an impact on various issues.3 A 
joint United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) and INTERPOL report points out 
that illegal logging accounts for 15-30% of all forestry products worldwide and 50-90% 
of all forestry products in key producer tropical countries.4 Aside from environmental 
issues, such as the depletion of forests and the destruction of wildlife habitat, and 
climate issues, such as the reduction of the absorption capacity for carbon emissions 
and the denuding of mountain slopes, illegal logging also has economic effects and an 
impact on trade.5 Hence, illegal logging causes a loss of revenue for governments in 
timber exporting countries, a loss of legitimate employment, and an increased risk of 
corruption. From an economic point of view, illegal logging distorts the market 
because it is cheaper than legitimate logging.6 Considering these undesirable results 
of illegal logging, most of which have clear global repercussions, there have been 
several initiatives to address illegal logging. On the one hand, private certification 
schemes (for example through the Forest Stewardship Council) were set up. In 
addition to these schemes, domestic forest programs were launched. To add to the 
complexities of the regulatory framework, certain supranational initiatives also address 
forest management. Interestingly, more recently forest management has seen the 
emergence of instruments that verify the legality of timber, such as the Timber 
Regulation.7  
 
The first part of this paper examines the Timber Regulation and its position in EU 
timber governance. Additionally, two other legislative proposals dealing with the issue 
                                                     
1
 Regulation (EU) 995/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the obligations of 
operators who place timber and timber products on the market [2010] OJ L295/23 (Timber Regulation). 
2
 Commission, ‘Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT): Proposal for an EU Action 
Plan’ COM (2003) 251 final. 
3
 M Pereira Goncalves et al, Justice for Forests: Improving Criminal Justice Efforts to Combat Illegal 
Logging (World Bank Study, World Bank 2012) 9-11. 
4
 C Nellemann (ed), Green Carbon, Black Trade: Illegal Logging, Tax Fraud and Laundering in the 
World’s Tropical Forests (United Nations Environmental Programme and INTERPOL 2012).  
5
 D Brack, ‘Illegal Logging’ (2007) Chatham House Briefing Paper, 1-2. 
6
 D Brack, ‘Illegal Logging’ (2007) Chatham House Briefing Paper, 2. 
7
 On the adequacy of legality verification, private schemes and domestic initiatives, see B Cashore and M 
Stone, ‘Can Legality Verification Rescue Global Forest Governance?: Analyzing the Potential of Public 
and Private Policy Intersection to Ameliorate Forest Challenges in Southeast Asia’ (2012) 18 Forest 
Policy and Economics 13, and the references there. See more generally on the regulatory framework of 
forest governance, including at the EU level, J Rayner, A Buck and P Katila (eds), ‘Embracing 
Complexity: Meeting the Challenges of International Forest Governance’ (World Series Volume 28, 
International Union of Forest Research Organizations 2010). 
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of illegal timber are addressed: the United States (U.S.) Lacey Act and the Australian 
Illegal Logging Prohibition Bill. These domestic legislative acts fit within the wider, 
international framework of regulation aimed at preserving exhaustible natural 
resources, including tropical or rain forests. Moreover, to a certain extent, all of these 
initiatives aim to implement the obligations these States have undertaken by virtue of 
their participation in a number of international initiatives that specifically aim to combat 
illegal logging. Nonetheless, concerns have been raised that these initiatives may not 
be consistent with the issuing state’s obligations as a Member of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). In the case of the EU, many provisions of the Timber Regulation 
have implications for international trade and it is not unlikely that in the (near) future 
another WTO Member may challenge the Timber Regulation. Therefore, the second 
part of this paper contains an analysis of the Timber Regulation’s consistency with the 
EU’s obligations under WTO law.  
 
II. COMBATTING TRADE IN ILLEGAL TIMBER IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE 
UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA 
 
A. EUROPEAN UNION: THE TWO PILLARS OF THE FLEGT ACTION PLAN 
 
As stated, the EU adopted the FLEGT action plan in 2003 to address ‘the growing 
problem of illegal logging and related trade’, which was named as one of the 
European Commission’s priorities. The action plan has led to both a licensing 
agreement based on Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs) and, more recently, 
the mandatory Timber Regulation. 
 
The voluntary licensing agreement was established by Council Regulation (EC) No 
2173/2005 (FLEGT Regulation).8 Its licensing scheme shall be implemented through 
Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs) with timber producing countries. FLEGT 
VPAs are bilateral agreements between the EU and timber exporting countries, which 
aim to guarantee that the wood exported to the EU has a legal source and to support 
partner countries in improving their own regulation and governance of the sector. 
Exporting countries commit themselves to establishing national licensing schemes 
that verify the legality of their shipments of timber and timber products to the EU. The 
EU has concluded six VPAs with timber exporting countries, with six other VPAs 
currently under negotiation.9 Once a VPA is in place, all covered timber and timber 
products exported from a partner country into the EU must comply in principle with the 
licensing system. Annex II of the FLEGT Regulation lists out a number of categories 
of timber products that are to be covered by all VPAs and their corresponding HS 
Tariff Classification headings. 10  Individual VPAs may cover additional timber and 
timber products.11 
                                                     
8
 Council Regulation (EC) 2173/2005 on the establishment of a FLEGT licensing scheme for imports of 
timber into the European Community [2005] OJ L347/1. The FLEGT Regulation is implemented by 
Commission Regulation (EC) 1024/2008 laying down detailed measures for the implementation of 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2173/2005 [2008] OJ L277/23. 
9
 Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Ghana, Indonesia, Liberia and the Republic of Congo 
(Brazzaville) have signed VPAs. The Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Guyana, Honduras, 
Malaysia and Vietnam are currently negotiating. 
10
 These are: 4403 Wood in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or sapwood, or roughly squared; 
4406 Railway or tramway sleepers (cross-ties) of wood; 4407 Wood sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced 
or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or end-jointed, of a thickness exceeding 6 mm; 4408 Sheets for 
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The Timber Regulation was adopted on 20 October 2010 and entered into force on 3 
March 2013. Its preamble reiterates that illegal logging is a pervasive problem of 
major international concern that contributes to deforestation and forest degradation, 
which is responsible for about 20% of global CO² emissions and threatens 
biodiversity. Moreover, it undercuts sustainable forest management and development, 
and it is a competitive disadvantage for timber that is legally logged. Furthermore, the 
preamble explains that the scale and urgency of illegal logging and related trade 
require a complement to and strengthening of the system of VPAs. In general, the 
Timber Regulation aims to address the economic, social, and environmental impacts 
of illegal logging. For that reason, it lays down obligations for operators who place 
timber and timber products on the internal market.12 An operator is defined as any 
natural or legal person that places timber or timber products on the market. The 
market is defined as the supply by any means, irrespective of the selling technique 
used, of timber or timber products for the first time on the internal market for 
distribution or for use in the course of a commercial activity.13 An operator is to be 
distinguished from a trader, who is any natural or legal person that, in the course of 
commercial activity, sells or buys timber or timber products already on the internal 
market.14 A guidance document issued by the European Commission contains more 
detailed definitions of terms used in the Timber Regulation.15 
 
The key element of the Timber Regulation is that it prohibits the placing illegally 
harvested timber or timber products from such timber on the market.16 Hence, in 
essence, the Timber Regulation has important extraterritorial effects as it addresses 
issues and concerns that took place outside the territory of the EU.17 It is important to 
note that the Regulation does not prohibit importing illegally harvested timber as such 
and hence it is not, strictly speaking, a border measure. However, it must be noted 
that, contrary to the text of the Timber Regulation, the above-mentioned guidance 
document uses the term ‘importing’ instead of ‘placing on the market’. The question as 
to whether timber or timber products can be identified as illegally logged is left up to 
the country of harvest and has to be made on the basis of the applicable legislation in 
the country of harvest, whether this is inside or outside the EU.18 This may pose 
questions as to the WTO-consistency of the regulation, which we address infra.  
 
                                                                                                                                                         
veneering (including those obtained by slicing laminated wood), for plywood or for other similar laminated 
wood and other wood, sawn lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded, spliced or end-
jointed, of a thickness not exceeding 6 mm; and 4412 Plywood, veneered panels and similar laminated 
wood. 
11
 For example, the VPA with Cameroon, also covers 4417 Tools, tool bodies, tool handles, broom or 
brush bodies and handles, in wood; boot or shoe lasts and trees of wood; 9403 30 Wooden furniture of a 
kind used in offices; 9403 40 Wooden furniture of a kind used in kitchens; 9403 50 Wooden furniture of a 
kind used in the bedroom; and 9403 60 Other wooden furniture. 
12
 Timber Regulation, art 2 (a)-(b). Timber products covered by the Timber Regulation are listed in the 
Annex, with their corresponding HS Tariff Classification headings.  
13
 ibid, art 2 (c). 
14
 ibid, art 2 (d). 
15
 Commission, ‘Guidance Document for the EU Timber Regulation’ (2013) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/environment/forests/pdf/Final%20Guidance%20document.pdf> accessed 9 April 
2013. 
16
 Timber Regulation, art 4.1. 
17
 L Ankersmit, J Lawrence and G Davies, ‘Diverging EU and WTO Perspectives on Extraterritorial 
Process Regulation (2012) 21 Minnesota Journal of International Law 14, 59. 
18
 Timber Regulation, art 2 (e)-(h). 
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Moreover, two categories of timber will automatically be considered legally harvested 
for the purposes of the Timber Regulation.19 The first category consists of timber 
embedded in timber products covered by VPAs, i.e. products originating in a VPA 
partner country and listed in the VPA. If these products comply with the requirements 
set out by the FLEGT Regulation and the corresponding implementing provisions, 
they shall be considered to have been legally harvested. The second category 
comprises of timber that is from species listed in Annex A, B, or C to Council 
Regulation (EC) No 338/97 (Wildlife Regulation) 20  and which complies with that 
Regulation and the corresponding implementing provisions. Such timber shall also be 
considered to have been legally harvested. The exemption of this category of timber 
from the application of the Timber Regulation is to be seen in the broader context of 
wildlife protection. Consequently, the 1973 Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) is uniformly implemented in all 
EU Member States by means of the Wildlife Regulation. 
 
CITES encompasses three appendices, each of which both contains a list of species 
and regulates trade.21 Species listed in Appendix I are endangered and may only be 
traded subject to conditions, one of which is that the primary purpose is not 
commercial. Appendix II contains the large majority of protected species. In order to 
trade these species, an export permit must be granted. The permit shall only be 
granted if export is not detrimental to the survival of the species—the so-called non-
detriment finding—and if no laws have been violated in harvesting the species. Trade 
in species listed in the Appendix III is subject to the condition that no laws have been 
violated in harvesting the species. Moreover, if a State that has listed the species in 
Appendix 3 imports the species from an exporter in a State that has not listed them, 
only a certificate of origin from the latter State is required for trade to be allowed. 
 
Instead of CITES’ three categories, the Wildlife Regulation contains four categories of 
species, listed in Annexes A-D. For species listed in Annex A or B, which are all 
CITES Appendix I and II species, some Appendix III species, and some non-CITES 
species, the conditions for trade set out by the Wildlife Regulation are more restrictive 
than those prescribed by CITES. For example, an import permit is required for species 
listed in Annex A or B, and it is prohibited to conduct most commercial activities with 
regard to species listed in Annex A. 
 
Concerning all other timber and timber products, operators are subjected to a due 
diligence obligation, which they may devise themselves, based on the framework 
                                                     
19
 ibid, art 3. 
20
 Council Regulation (EC) 338/97 on the protection of species of wild fauna and flora by regulating trade 
therein [1997] OJ L61/1. The Wildlife Regulation has, in its turn, been implemented by Commission 
Regulation (EC) 865/2006 laying down detailed rules concerning the implementation of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 338/97 on the protection of species of wild fauna and flora by regulating trade therein 
[2006] OJ L166/1; Commission Recommendation 2007/425/EC identifying a set of actions for the 
enforcement of Regulation (EC) No 338/97 on the protection of species of wild fauna and flora by 
regulating trade therein [2007] OC L159/45; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 757/2012 
suspending the introduction into the Union of specimens of certain species of wild fauna and flora [2012] 
OJ L223/31; and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 792/2012 laying down rules for the design 
of permits, certificates and other documents provided for in Council Regulation (EC) No 338/97 on the 
protection of species of wild fauna and flora by regulating trade therein [2012] OJ L242/13.  
21
 CITES, arts II:4, III, IV, and V. 
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contained in the Timber Regulation.22 Alternatively, a monitoring organization may 
provide a due diligence system and grant operators a right to use them.23 The due 
diligence system requires operators to keep track of information related to the 
marketing of timber or timber products. Furthermore, it contains risk assessment and 
risk mitigation procedures enabling the operator to analyze the risk of illegally 
harvested timber or timber products derived from such timber being placed on the 
market. Aside from operators, traders are also subjected to obligations. They must 
also be able to identify throughout the supply chain: a) the operator or traders who 
have supplied the timber and timber products and b) where applicable, the traders to 
whom they have supplied timber and timber products. This traceability obligation 
requires the relevant information to be kept for at least five years and to be made 
available to the relevant authorities upon request.24 
 
In order to safeguard the application of the Timber Regulation, every EU Member 
State is to designate competent authorities, which are to check whether operators 
fulfill their due diligence obligations.25 EU Member States must provide for penalties in 
case of a violation of the due diligence obligations. These penalties are to be effective, 
proportionate, and dissuasive.26 
 
B. UNITED STATES: LACEY ACT 
 
In 2008, U.S. Congress amended the environmental Lacey Act of 1900 by 
substantially expanding its scope regarding flora to explicitly include trees and adding 
a system of mandatory import declarations.27 Plants are defined as any wild member 
of the plant kingdom, including roots, seeds, parts, and products thereof, and 
including trees from either natural or planted forest stands.28 The Lacey Act prohibits 
the import, export, transport, sale, reception, acquisition, purchase in interstate or 
foreign commerce, or possession of any plant taken, possessed, transported, or sold 
in violation of any law or regulation of any relevant U.S. State or foreign law which 
protects plants or regulates their export.29 Additionally, it is prohibited to import any 
plant without filing an import declaration.30 A violation of these obligations can be 
punished with imprisonment for up to five years, a penalty up to 500,000US$ per 
violation, or both, per offence.31 Penalties are dependent on whether the importer 
knowingly or unknowingly violated the Lacey Act, and on which obligation is violated. 
                                                     
22
 ibid, arts 4.2-4.3 and 6.1. 
23
 ibid, arts 4.3, and 8. Also see Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 363/2012 on the procedural 
rules for the recognition and withdrawal of recognition of monitoring organisations as provided for in 
Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 [2012] OJ L115/12. 
24
 Timber Regulation, art 5. 
25
 ibid, arts 7 and 10-12. Also see Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 607/2012 on the detailed 
rules concerning the due diligence system and the frequency and nature of the checks on monitoring 
organisations as provided for in Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 [2012] OJ L177/16, which stipulates, inter 
alia, the term within which the due diligence system shall be applied by operators, the way in which the 
information has to be supplied by the operator, the way in which risk assessment and mitigation 
procedures have to be carried out, and the frequency and nature of checks on monitoring organizations. 
26
 Timber Regulation, art 19. 
27
 Chapter 53 of Title 16 United States Code (Lacey Act). The relevant provisions are paras 3371-3378. 
28
 Lacey Act, para 3371(f) (1). 
29
 Lacey Act, paras 3372 (a) (2) (B), (3) (B), and (4). The exact content laws or regulations which may not 
be violated is listed under para 3372 (a) (2) (B). 
30
 ibid, paras 3372 (f) (1)-(3). 
31
 ibid, paras 3373 (a) and (d). 
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Hence, a company is required to exercise due diligence by devising its own system. 
However, complying with those requirements does not lead to impunity: a civil fine of 
up to 250$ and forfeiture of the goods remain possible even if U.S. officials consider 
that the company’s due diligence system was sufficient and it was properly 
executed. 32  Enforcement of the Lacey Act is conferred to the Secretaries of 
Agriculture, the Interior, Commerce, Transportation, or the Treasury.33 
 
It has been noted by several scholars that the Lacey Act is unlikely to give rise to a 
WTO challenge as it is not a border measure and applies equally to imported and 
domestic plants.34 Not all authors agree: Tanczos argues that the import declaration 
may cause WTO issues as it affects imported goods only and increases costs for 
importers. Moreover, the Lacey Act confers different treatment to timber that violates 
national laws and timber that does not. Moreover, if ‘legally’ and ‘illegally’ harvested 
timber are to be considered like products, this difference in treatment raises issues 
under Article I of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT), which 
contains the obligation to grant Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) treatment. The author 
also argues that Article XX(d) GATT, which contains an exception to GATT obligations 
for measures necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations not 
inconsistent with GATT, is not applicable because the Appellate Body (AB) interpreted 
that provision’s scope in such a way that the Lacey Act does not fall within it.35 The AB 
noted that the term ‘laws or regulations’ with which the measure of the WTO Member 
invoking the exception seeks to secure compliance, only refers to domestic laws while 
the Lacey Act seeks to enforce international obligations. 36  However, such an 
approach fails to take into account that the Lacey Act could also aim to ensure 
compliance with other domestic laws. We will address this issue with regard to the 
Timber Regulation infra. 
 
C. AUSTRALIA: ILLEGAL LOGGING PROHIBITION BILL 
 
In 2012, Australia introduced the Illegal Logging Prohibition Bill (Bill), which—in 
contrast to the Timber Regulation—prohibits the importation into Australia, as well as 
the domestic processing, of illegally logged timber and timber products. Furthermore, 
it obliges importers of timber and processors of raw logs to conduct due diligence.37 
Illegally logged timber is defined as timber harvested in violation of the laws of the 
country of harvest; in the case of the processing of raw logs this means Australia, 
since imported raw logs are exempted from the rules on processing of illegally logged 
raw logs.38 The list of timber products that are to fall within the scope of the Bill is to 
be established in supplementary legislation. Compliance with the Bill is to be ensured 
                                                     
32
 Environmental Investigation Agency and World Resources Institute, ‘Are You Ready for the Lacey 
Act?’ (Fact Sheet, Environmental Investigation Agency and World Resources Institute 2009) figure 1.  
33
 Lacey Act, para 3375 (a) juncto para 3371 (h). 
34
 D Brack, ‘Combating Illegal Logging: Interaction with WTO Rules’ (2009) Chatham House Briefing 
Paper, 9; S Bernstein and E Hannah, ‘The WTO and Institutional (In)Coherence in Global Economic 
Governance’ in A Narlikar, M Daunton and R Stern (eds), The Oxford Handbook on the World Trade 
Organization (Oxford University Press 2012) 801. 
35
 F G Tanczos, ‘A New Crime: Possession of Wood – Remedying the Due Care Double Standard of the 
Revised Lacey Act’, (2011) 42 Rutgers Law Journal 549, 579-584. 
36
 Appellate Body Report, Mexico — Soft Drinks, WT/DS308/AB/R, para 69. 
37
 Illegal Logging Prohibition Bill, ss 6, 8-9, 12-15 and 17-18. 
38
 ibid, s 7. 
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through monitoring and investigations by government designated inspectors.39 The Bill 
puts the following penalties: i) five years imprisonment or 500 penalty units,40 or both, 
on the importation of illegally logged timber or timber products and the processing of 
illegally logged raw logs; ii) 300 penalty units for violating the due diligence 
requirements related to importing illegally logged timber or timber products or 
processing raw logs; and iii) 100 penalty units for not making a customs declaration. 
 
The consistency of the Bill with Australia’s WTO obligations has been the subject of 
some academic research. Brack, Chandra, and Kinasih argue that legally and illegally 
harvested timber are not like products because the decisive issue is not content of the 
various national laws, but rather compliance or non-compliance with whatever national 
laws exist. Consequently, in their view the Bill does not violate Articles I or III GATT. 
However, the Bill might violate Article XI GATT as it limits timber imports in the sense 
of that provision. These authors consider Article XX(g) GATT, which provides an 
exception to WTO obligations for measures relating to the conservation of exhaustible 
natural resources, the strongest defense for the Bill.41 Mitchell and Ayres conclude 
that the Bill discriminates between like products as the definition of illegally logged 
depends on varying domestic standards in the country of harvest, thereby likely 
violating Article I GATT. Moreover, the Bill is likely to be inconsistent with Article XI 
GATT.42  
 
According to Mitchell and Ayres, the Bill can probably not be justified by the 
exceptions contained in Article XX GATT. Moreover, it is noted that if the Bill were to 
fall within the scope of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT 
Agreement), it is likely to be inconsistent with Articles 2.1 and 2.2 thereof.43 Stephens 
and Saul contest that, under the definitions of the Bill, legally and illegally harvested 
timber are like products. In addition, they argue that, as the Bill refers the legality test 
back to national laws, it respects the conditions of production and competition, and 
thus alleviates issues concerning unilateral trade restrictive measures. Nonetheless, 
compliance with Article XI:1 GATT is identified as a potential issue by these authors 
as well. Stephens and Saul argue that, although this remains speculative, the Bill 
might withstand the test of Article XX(g) and possibly (b) GATT. However, they 
observe that timber is ‘illegal’ if it is harvested in violation of any law, including, for 
example, labor standards or human rights. Although this issue may still be remedied 
by an implementing decision, it may, for now, violate the condition of being made 
effective in conjunction with domestic restrictions of Article XX(g) GATT.44 
                                                     
39
 ibid, ss 19-58. 
40
 Crimes Act 1914, s 4AA. At the time of writing, a penalty unit is 170AU$ or 135€ or 180US$. The 
amount is indexed yearly. 
41
 D Brack, A Chandra and H Kinasih, ‘The Australian Government’s Illegal Logging Prohibition Bill: WTO 
implications’ (Report, International Institute for Sustainable Development Trade Knowledge Network 
2012). 
42
 A Mitchell and G Ayres, ‘Out of Crooked Timber: The Consistency of Australia’s Illegal Logging 
Prohibition Bill with the WTO Agreement’ (2012) 29 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 462, 467-
471. 
43
 A Mitchell and G Ayres, ‘Out of Crooked Timber: The Consistency of Australia’s Illegal Logging 
Prohibition Bill with the WTO Agreement’ (2012) 29 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 462, 475-
477. The authors, however, note that, for now, the Bill does not lay down technical regulations; it does 
not fall under the scope of the TBT Agreement. 
44
 T Stephens and B Saul, ‘Not Yet Out of the Woods: Australia's Attempt to Regulate Illegal Timber 
Imports and World Trade Organisation Obligations’ (2012) 19 Australian International Law Journal 143. 
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III. THE WTO-CONSISTENCY OF EU REGULATION 995/2010 
 
As demonstrated in the previous section, the EU, the U.S., and Australia seemingly 
adopt a similar approach in denying illegally logged timber access to their respective 
markets. Having assessed the three main national legislative schemes to address the 
problem of illegal logging, we now turn to the question of WTO-consistency of the 
EU’s Timber Regulation.  
 
A. TRADE EFFECTS OF THE TIMBER REGULATION: CONCERNS RAISED IN THE WTO 
 
The question of WTO-consistency of the Timber Regulation does not come from 
nowhere. At the latest Trade Policy Review of the European Union, which took place 
in 2011, a number of WTO Members expressed their concern regarding the 
Regulation. The representative for Canada noted: 
‘labelling or traceability requirements beyond what is necessary for consumer 
information can place a disproportionate burden on imports given the 
complexities of manufacturing processes and global value-chains. For 
example the EU's Illegal Timber Regulation has traceability requirements that 
could provide an unfair competitive advantage to manufacturers of forest 
products in the EU compared to their international competitors.’45 
Indonesia also expressed its concern with respect to the due diligence system 
established by the Regulation.46 El Salvador asked why the European Union did not 
notify the TBT Committee of the proposed Regulation. In response, the EU stated that 
‘the proposal for Regulation (EU) 995/2010 did not contain any technical regulations 
and that is why no notification under the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
has been made.’47 The Trade Policy Review Report prepared by the WTO Secretariat 
places the Timber Regulation under the heading of ‘measures directly affecting 
imports’ and ‘restrictions and controls’.48 It further stipulates [in relevant part]:  
‘Quantitative restrictions and controls on imports are in place to implement 
sanctions imposed by United Nations resolutions, and provisions under 
international treaties or conventions. In addition, the EU maintains unilateral 
import controls to attain non-economic objectives.’49 
 
In general, it can be concluded that timber-exporting countries have expressed 
concern with respect to the potential trade-restrictive effects of legislation aiming to 
address illegal logging. As noted by Mitchell and Ayres, so far only Argentina has 
questioned the motives behind these types of legislation.50 They refer to a meeting of 
                                                                                                                                                         
With regard to Article XX(g) GATT, the authors raise an interesting point regarding the definition of 
‘illegal’, which is addressed further. 
45
 WTO, Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review of the European Union, Minutes of the Meeting 
on the 6th and 8th of July 2011, 14 September 2011, WT/TPR/M/248, para 135. 
46
 WTO, Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review of the European Union, Minutes of the Meeting 
on the 6th and 8th of July 2011, 31 August 2011, WT/TPR/M/248/Add.1, 364. 
47
 ibid, 396. 
48
 WTO, Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review of the European Union, Report by the 
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the TBT Committee where the representative for Argentina stated, in response to a 
notification by the U.S. concerning the Lacey Act, that: 
‘the regulation [the implementation of Revised Lacey Act Provisions] was not 
necessarily intended to protect endangered species but rather to protect 
domestic markets from imports.’51 
 
One of the functions of the WTO is the settlement of trade disputes between its 
Members.52 A Member may bring a complaint against a fellow Member if it considers 
that benefits accruing to it under the covered agreements are being impaired by the 
actions of that other Member.53 Although the reaction of the countries affected by the 
Timber Regulation seems to have been muted so far, it is still warranted to assess 
whether the Regulation would withstand WTO scrutiny. In the following paragraphs, it 
will be established that the Timber Regulation may become subject of WTO Dispute 
Settlement Proceedings. Additionally, an analysis will be provided of the consistency 
of that Regulation with the EU’s obligations as a WTO Member. 
 
However, it is appropriate to point out that the likelihood of a WTO challenge may be 
rather limited. As stated, a key feature of the EUTR is that the assessment of legality 
is made on the basis of the domestic laws of the country of harvest. Hence, it is 
unlikely for a country that has legislation in place making certain timber illegal to file a 
WTO complaint alleging a breach of another Member’s WTO obligations for restricting 
the importation of the very same illegally logged timber. The theoretical question 
underlying this problem is whether the rules of the WTO do apply to illicit trade in the 
same way as they apply to trade in legal products. Ultimately, it is more likely that a 
WTO Member would challenge the EU Timber Regulation in so far as its due diligence 
requirements lead to a disparate impact upon the export of legally harvested timber of 
the Member in question. However, it would be very hard to assess such a claim in 
abstracto. Nonetheless, considering the economic importance of the EU marketplace 
for foreign producers, more measures that restrict market access such as the EUTR 
are likely to be used as governance tools. Hence, the questions that arise in the 
following substantive analysis remain poignant. Moreover, the EUTR may serve as a 
WTO compliant example of how to govern through trade, regardless of crucial 
questions of effectiveness and extraterritoriality. 
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B. SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS 
 
The principles of market access and non-discrimination are the cornerstones of the 
multilateral trading system. WTO Members may not discriminate between products 
originating in the territories of different Members. This MFN treatment obligation is 
contained in Article I:1 GATT. Next to this MFN treatment obligation, WTO Members 
may not treat domestic products ‘more favorably’ then ‘like’ imported products. This 
‘National Treatment’ obligation is laid down in Article III GATT. Furthermore, WTO 
Members have committed themselves to the obligation not to impose prohibitions or 
restrictions other than duties, taxes, or other charges, by virtue of Article XI GATT. 
These three obligations are relevant in assessing the GATT-consistency of the Timber 
Regulation. In addition to these obligations, however, Article XX GATT contains a 
number of exceptions that may, under certain conditions, ‘remedy’ an otherwise 
GATT-inconsistent measure.54  
 
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
 
(a) Article XI GATT 
 
Article XI GATT stipulates in paragraph 1:  
‘no prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, 
whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other 
measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the 
importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party or on 
the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any 
other contracting party.’  
As such, this article prohibits quantitative restrictions on imports. The scope of this 
article is very broad, as was defined by Panels.55 The Panel in Dominican Republic – 
Cigarettes held that ‘measures which affect the opportunities for importation itself’ 
would be covered by the terms ‘prohibitions or restrictions.’56 In Brazil – Retreaded 
Tyres the Panel clarified the term ‘prohibitions’; it held that the term was unambiguous 
and that it means that ‘Members shall not forbid the importation of any product of any 
other Member into their markets.’57 Article XI covers both de jure as well as de facto 
prohibitions or restrictions, as was held by the Panel in Argentina – Hides and 
Leather.58 
 
As noted above, the Timber Regulation prohibits ‘operators’ from placing ‘illegally 
harvested timber’ on the market. The enforcement of this prohibition is ensured by 
Article 19 of the Regulation, which requires EU Member States to set up a system of 
effective penalties applicable to infringements of the Regulation. In this respect, it is 
again appropriate to refer to the Panel in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres. It held that: 
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‘In the present case, we note that the fines as a whole, including that on 
marketing, have the effect of penalizing the act of "importing" retreaded 
tyres by subjecting retreaded tyres already imported and existing in the 
Brazilian internal market to the prohibitively expensive rate of fines. To 
that extent, we consider that the fact that the fines are not administered at 
the border does not alter their nature as a restriction on importation within 
the meaning of Article XI:1. In addition, the level of the fines – R$ 400 per 
unit, which significantly exceeds the average prices of domestically 
produced retreaded tyres for passenger cars (R$ 100-280) – is significant 
enough to have a restrictive effect on importation.’59 
 
The similarities to the Timber Regulation are striking. Although the Regulation does 
not implement a de jure prohibition on imports such as a ban on illegally logged 
timber, it certainly results in a de facto prohibition. Importers, or ‘operators’, will 
become very cautious in importing timber, regardless of whether it has been 
harvested legally or illegally, since a failure to live up to the due diligence standards 
might result in criminal liability. It might be argued that this is a private decision, taken 
by each individual operator. However, the AB has stated in Korea – Beef that ‘the 
intervention of some element of private choice’ does not relieve a WTO Member of 
responsibility for the restrictive effects of a measure.60 Charnovitz has noted that the 
‘illegality of importation under the law of the importing country is not a justification 
under WTO rules to block the importation.’61 Consequently, the measure, in as far as 
it criminalizes the act of importation of illegally harvested timber, appears to be 
inconsistent with Article XI GATT since it constitutes a restriction on importation. 
 
(b) Article III GATT 
 
Even if the set of measures laid down by the Timber Regulation were not to be 
considered a quantitative restriction in the sense of Article XI GATT, they could 
potentially still qualify as an internal measure in the sense of Article III GATT. This 
provision contains the National Treatment obligation, which essentially requires WTO 
Members not to treat foreign products less favorably than like domestic products. 
Article III:4 GATT states [in relevant part]: 
‘The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the 
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less 
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect 
of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, 
offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.’ [emphasis 
added]. 
The question is therefore whether the Timber Regulation accords the ‘illegally 
harvested timber’ less favorable treatment than it does ‘like’ domestic timber. This 
requires an answer to the question as to whether ‘illegally harvested’ timber is ‘like’ 
legally harvested domestic timber. However, first it must be established first whether 
the Timber Regulation is an internal measure or a border measure. 
                                                     
59
 Panel Report, Brazil — Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/R, paras 7.372–7.373. 
60
 Appellate Body Report, Korea — Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, para 146. 
61
 S Charnovitz, ‘The World Trade Organization and Law Enforcement’ (2003) 37 Journal of World Trade 
817, 830. 
12 
 
 
(i) Is the Timber Regulation an internal measure: Article XI vs Article III:4? 
 
Article III GATT only applies to internal measures. From the ad note to the article it 
can be derived that Article III GATT would apply to border measures if the product in 
question fails to meet a requirement that is also applied to like domestic products.62 
Howse sees Article III:4 and Article XI GATT as mutually exclusive. In his view, ‘the 
architecture of the GATT would make little sense if internal laws, regulations and 
requirements could also be viewed as restrictions and prohibitions on imports or 
exports. If that were so, then internal laws, regulations, and requirements would be 
prima facie violations of the GATT, even if they were nondiscriminatory.’63 However, 
as van den Bossche notes, it is possible that one measure is both an internal measure 
and a border measure.64 Contrary to the Australian Illegal Logging Prohibition Bill, the 
Timber Regulation does not explicitly prohibit the importation of illegally harvested 
timber; rather, it prohibits the ‘placing on the market’ of such timber, thereby implying 
that timber that originates in the EU and was harvested illegally may also not be 
placed onto the market. In light of the foregoing we will assess whether the Regulation 
withstands the two-tier test of consistency with Article III GATT.  
  
(ii) Likeness  
 
In EC – Asbestos the AB held that  
‘a determination of ‘likeness’ under Article III:4 is, fundamentally, a 
determination about the nature and extent of a competitive relationship 
between and among products.’65  
In determining whether products can indeed be considered ‘like’, one has to assess 
four criteria: (i) physical characteristics, (ii) end use, (iii) consumer tastes and habits, 
and (iv) tariff classification. The physical characteristics, end uses, and tariff 
classification of legally harvested and illegally harvested timber are essentially the 
same. Consumer tastes and habits are the only criterion on which an argument of 
‘unlikeness’ could reasonably be made. One might argue that consumers have a 
preference for legally logged timber and that they prefer to buy products that do not 
contain illegally harvested timber. If this preference for legally logged timber is strong 
                                                     
62
 Note Ad Article III: ‘Any internal tax or other internal charge, or any law, regulation or requ irement of 
the kind referred to in paragraph 1 which applies to an imported product and to the like domestic product 
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enough, this might detract substantially from the competitive relationship between the 
two groups of products thereby making them unlike. As noted by Bartels, this requires 
a case-by-case analysis in which, by means of quantitative methods, one would have 
to ascertain what the identifiable groups of consumers (commercial or natural 
persons) are. In his view, it is likely that based on this analysis, the products will be 
considered unlike.66 Two points can be raised against this conclusion, however. First, 
in the case of the Timber Regulation, illegality is determined by the legislation of the 
country of harvest. Consumers will often not be aware of the conditions laid down by 
this particular legislation. Secondly, as noted by Mitchell and Ayres, if the (il)legality of 
the timber or timber products is the only difference between two otherwise identical 
products, the consumer preference for legally harvested timber would not be 
sufficiently strong to detract substantially from the competitive relationship between 
the two groups of products.67 Mitchell and Ayres therefore conclude that illegally and 
legally harvested timber are like products. Brack, Chandra, and Kinasih oppose this 
conclusion as they argue that the likeness should be determined based on 
compliance with whatever national legislation exists, regardless of its content. This is 
exactly what the Timber Regulation does. Their point of view seems to be that when 
national legislation of another country determines that a certain product is illegal, the 
competitive relationship between that product and a similar legal product ceases to 
exist.68  
 
With respect to the Australian Illegal Logging Prohibition Bill, Mitchell and Ayres 
conclude that: 
‘The end uses of those products would be the same, and even their processes 
and production methods could be identical because the definition of “illegally 
logged” in the Bill focuses solely on the laws of the country of origin, not on the 
method of harvesting. It may be that Australian consumers might prefer to 
purchase products that do not contain illegal timber. However, it seems likely 
that if the products were identical in every other way, including in their impact 
on the environment, this preference would not be strong enough to 
substantially detract from the competitive relationship between them.’69 
 
Brack, Chandra and Kinasih respond by stating: 
‘Taking this argument—that discrimination on the basis of legality is 
inconsistent with WTO rules—to its logical conclusion, it would appear that 
national laws cannot be used at all as a basis to restrict trade in illegal 
timber—or indeed, in anything else. For any legislation affecting anything that 
could be traded, every country should have the same laws. […] It seems 
unlikely that the drafters of the GATT and the other WTO agreements had this 
conclusion in mind when they negotiated their final texts. It is not the content of 
the laws that should be the issue for a WTO dispute, but compliance or non-
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compliance with whatever national laws exist. Following this argument, legal 
and illegal timber are not like products.’70 
It appears that in their view, products that are illegal in a certain country can never be 
in a competitive relationship with, and hence ‘like’, similar products originating in a 
country where they are legal because trade in those illegal products would be 
impossible since these products are unauthorized.  
 
In that case, absent like products there is no issue of non-discrimination under Article 
III:4. However, for the sake of argument, assuming that illegal and legal timber are 
indeed like products, we now turn to the question of whether the Timber Regulation 
accords less favorable treatment to like imported products. 
 
(iii) Less Favorable Treatment 
 
Article III:4 GATT applies to both de jure and de facto violations. The Timber 
Regulation does not explicitly differentiate between domestic and imported timber. 
The obligations it lays down for operators and traders apply irrespectively of whether 
the timber is produced within the EU or in a third country. Consequently, any claim of 
inconsistency with respect to Article III:4 GATT would amount to an allegation of de 
facto discrimination. 
 
In Korea – Beef the AB stated that: 
‘A formal difference in treatment between imported and like domestic products 
is thus neither necessary, nor sufficient, to show a violation of Article III:4. 
Whether or not imported products are treated "less favourably" than like 
domestic products should be assessed instead by examining whether a 
measure modifies the conditions of competition in the relevant market to the 
detriment of imported products.’71 [emphasis in the original]. 
In Dominican Republic – Cigarettes the AB elaborated upon the term ‘to the detriment 
of imported products’ by clarifying that ‘the existence of a detrimental effect on a given 
imported product resulting from a measure does not necessarily imply that this 
measure accords less favorable treatment to imports if the detrimental effect is 
explained by factors or circumstances unrelated to the foreign origin of the product 
…’.72 Based on this, Bartels suggests that it is necessary to assess whether there are 
‘factors or circumstances’ that explain the discriminatory effect of the measure. 
Subsequently, one would have to establish whether these factors and circumstances 
are related to the origin of the products.73 In US – Clove Cigarettes the AB held that:  
‘the "treatment no less favourable" standard of Article III:4 GATT 1994 
prohibits WTO Members from modifying the conditions of competition in the 
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marketplace to the detriment of the group of imported products vis-à-vis the 
group of domestic like products.’74  
Flett argues, based on paragraph 100 of the same AB Report, that Art. III:4 GATT 
must be interpreted analogously to Article 2.1 TBT Agreement as they are both built 
around the same core terms.75 Consequently, in his view, ‘regulatory distinctions that 
stem exclusively from the pursuit of legitimate objectives remain permissible.’ 76 
Therefore, if the regulatory distinction between illegally and legally harvested timber 
stems exclusively from the pursuit of legitimate objectives, the difference in treatment 
by means of the prohibition on placing illegally harvested timber on the market would 
not constitute less favorable treatment in the sense of Article III:4 GATT. The 
objectives of the Regulation can be found in the preamble and they range from 
maintaining biodiversity, combatting deforestation, and protecting the climate 
system.77 Since the Regulation is applied in an ‘even-handed’ manner, there does not 
appear to be a detrimental impact on imported timber.  
 
Consequently, even assuming that illegally logged timber is like legally logged timber, 
it will be difficult to answer the question whether less favorable treatment has been 
accorded to illegal timber in the affirmative. Therefore, to the extent that the Timber 
Regulation can be considered an internal measure falling under Article III:4 GATT, it is 
likely to be consistent with the substantive requirements of that article. 
 
(c) Article I GATT 
 
The MFN treatment obligation enshrined in Article I:1 GATT essentially requires WTO 
Members not to discriminate between foreign ‘like’ products on the basis of their 
origin. It provides [in relevant part] that: 
‘with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and 
exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of 
Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any 
contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country 
shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product 
originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.’78 
The Timber Regulation sets out a set of rules that operators have to comply with in 
order to legally place timber or timber products on the internal market for the first time. 
It therefore establishes rules and formalities in connection with importation; hence, 
Article I:1 GATT is applicable. The next question is whether the Timber Regulation 
confers an advantage. In EC – Bananas, the AB held that an advantage exists where 
a measure creates ‘more favourable import opportunities’ for certain products 
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depending on their origin. The concept of ‘advantage’ must be interpreted broadly. 
This reading was confirmed in Canada – Autos, where the AB held that advantages 
might result from either positive or negative treatment for the product at issue.79 In the 
case at hand, timber that has been legally harvested may be marketed in the EU, 
whereas timber that has been harvested illegally may not be placed onto the internal 
market. Consequently, the Timber Regulation does confer an advantage to certain 
products. 
 
(i) Likeness  
 
Secondly, it has to be established whether illegally logged timber and timber products 
are ‘like’ legally logged timber and timber products. Only a handful of Panel Reports 
deal with the concept of ‘like products’ under Article I:1 GATT. The term ‘like products’ 
is used on more than one occasion in the GATT, and although the AB held in Japan – 
Alcoholic Beverages II that the meaning of the concept varies according to its context, 
elements from the likeness test carried out under Article III:4 GATT can still be used.80 
Assuming that, based on the four-criterion test as set out by the AB in EC – Asbestos, 
illegally logged timber is like legally logged timber, there would be a violation of Article 
I:1 GATT because the advantage accorded to legally logged timber is not accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to like products from other WTO Members.  
 
(d) Article XX GATT 
 
As is clear from the first recital of the Marrakesh Agreement, which establishes the 
WTO, enhancing trade is not the organization’s sole objective.81 In certain situations, 
measures pursuing certain policy objectives other than liberalizing trade must be 
balanced with WTO obligations. For this reason, the agreement includes exceptions to 
justify measures that violate WTO obligations. In this respect, the most important 
provision is Article XX GATT, which contains the general exceptions. However, in 
order to benefit from these exceptions, two conditions must be fulfilled: the WTO 
Member maintaining the measure must establish first that the measure comes within 
the scope of one of the policy exceptions listed in Article XX GATT and second that 
the measure is also consistent with the chapeau of this provision. 
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With regard to the first step of justifying a measure inconsistent with GATT 
obligations, three policy exceptions may be applicable to the Timber Regulation at first 
glance: measures aiming to protect human, animal, or plant life or health; measures 
necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent 
with the GATT; and measures relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources. After addressing these policy exceptions, we address the compatibility of 
the Timber Regulation with the chapeau of Article XX GATT. 
 
(i) Article XX(b): Human, animal or plant life 
 
Measures which are necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health may 
be justified under Article XX(b) GATT. Therefore, it must first be established that the 
measure is covered by the policy exception. In US – Gasoline, the Panel accepted 
that the contested measure was covered by Article XX(b) GATT since it concerned 
animal and plant health; this was based on the link between the measure at hand, 
which aimed to reduce air pollution, and the effect of air pollution on human, animal, 
and plant health.82 However, in two other cases, Panels held that the measure was 
not covered by the policy exception because the text, design, architecture, and 
structure of the measure were not for the purpose of the protection of health. 83 
Although these findings indicate that the coverage of this exception does not extend to 
the mere side effects of a measure, the measures under scrutiny in the two latter 
cases can be distinguished from the Timber Regulation, which aims to protect animal 
and plant life by protecting biodiversity, ecosystem functions, and the climate 
system.84 The link between illegal logging and these aims appears clear, but it would 
nonetheless be the subject of a factual analysis by a Panel. 
 
Successively, it must be established that the measure is necessary to achieve the 
policy objective. It is important to highlight that the necessity test does not include an 
assessment of the appropriateness of the end sought by the measure.85 ‘Necessary’ 
is not to read as ‘indispensable’, although its meaning in the context of Article XX 
GATT is closer to ‘being indispensable’ than it is to ‘making a contribution to’.86 The 
interpretation of the necessity condition arguably encompasses three factors: (i) the 
relative importance of the common interests or values that are intended to be 
protected by the challenged measure, (ii) the contribution of the measure to the 
objective pursued by the measure, and (iii) whether an alternative measure which is 
less trade restrictive than the measure under scrutiny is reasonably available.87 When 
considering the second factor, it must be assessed whether the measure is apt to 
make a material contribution to the policy objective pursued. This means assessing 
whether there is a ‘genuine relationship of ends and means between the objective 
pursued and the measure at issue’, which is neither merely marginal nor insufficient. 
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Therefore, a Panel must make quantitative projections or have qualitative reasoning 
based on evidence.88 Regarding the third factor, it must be noted that it is up to the 
complainant to identify alternative measures. 89  However, if the Panel finds these 
alternatives to be genuine alternatives and not complementary measures, the 
respondent must demonstrate that the alternative is not readily available, i.e. that it 
imposes an unduly burden on the respondent or is merely theoretical.90   
 
In the case of the Timber Regulation, it should be said that the importance of the 
common interest or values protected by it are not considered to be of equal 
importance to human life. Nonetheless, the interpretation of the term ‘exhaustible 
natural resources’, which we address infra, shows that the AB is not insensitive to the 
importance of flora. It remains a question as to the extent this factor plays a role in the 
weighing and balancing exercise that is the application of the necessity test. The 
second factor, at first, does not appear to be very problematic. The Timber 
Regulation’s prohibition to place illegally harvested timber on the internal market 
clearly makes a material contribution to the policy goal of protecting plant (and animal, 
and perhaps also human) life as there is a genuine relationship, which is neither 
marginal nor incidental, between the Timber Regulation and the relevant policy goal. 
As concerns the third factor, it is not unthinkable that a complainant would come up 
with a less trade restrictive alternative measure. An example of such an alternative, as 
proposed by Canada and Norway in the context of the EC – Seal Products case,91 
could be a licensing or certification system. However, it is not easy for the complainant 
to establish that such a system would attain the same level of protection as contained 
in the Timber Regulation and would be reasonably available.92 Nonetheless, it must 
be stressed that a Panel’s analysis of the facts of the case, including information 
submitted by the complainant, may lead to different views regarding the necessity of 
the Timber Regulation. 
 
(ii) Article XX(d): Compliance measures 
 
In case a measure is necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations that are 
not inconsistent with the provisions of the GATT, Article XX(d) may justify a violation 
of a Member’s WTO obligations. To benefit from this exception, a measure must come 
within the scope of this provision. In Mexico – Soft Drinks, the AB decided that the 
measure must therefore be designed to enforce compliance of domestic laws or 
regulations, even if there is no certainty that it will.93 Hence, it is sufficient that the 
design of a measure contributes to securing compliance. 94  The preamble to the 
Timber Regulation appears to foresee this option, as it refers to illegal logging as a 
threat to ‘the commercial viability of operators acting in accordance with applicable 
legislation’.95 This indicates that the Timber Regulation aims to ensure compliance 
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either with legislation that, for example, prevents deceptive practices 96  or, more 
broadly, with EU competition or consumer protection laws. 97  Moreover, the Panel 
stated that ‘there should be a degree of certainty in the results that may be achieved 
through the measure’ for it to be covered by this exception. 98  Considering its 
substantive obligations, the Timber Regulation appears to hold a reasonable chance 
of success of doing so. 
 
As addressed under Article XX(b) GATT, the measure must be necessary to be 
justified under this policy exception. The legal analysis of this requirement here is 
almost identical to the one under Article XX(b) GATT.99 However, when applying the 
necessity test regarding this policy exception to the Timber Regulation, problems 
appear to arise. It can be seriously questioned whether no alternative measure which 
is less trade restrictive than the measure under scrutiny is reasonably available to 
secure compliance with the mentioned laws or regulations. Considering that the 
nature of Article XX GATT is to provide a balance between trade liberalization and 
other societal values and interests, 100  it would seem that justifying the Timber 
Regulation under this policy exception would disrupt this balance. 
 
(iii) Article XX(g): Conservation of exhaustible natural resources 
 
Article XX(g) GATT provides a justification for measures ‘relating to the conservation 
of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction 
with restrictions on domestic production or consumption’. This provision has been 
previously found to encompass, for example, things such as clean air and sea turtles, 
and has hence been interpreted broadly.101 Therefore, it is safe to assume that forests 
would fall within the scope of Article XX(g) GATT. To justify a measure under this 
provision, two more conditions should be fulfilled. 
 
First, it must be remarked that this policy exception requires the measure at hand to 
‘relate to’ the policy objective, rather than ‘be necessary’. For a measure to relate to a 
policy objective, the relationship between on the one hand, the general structure and 
design of the measure, and on the other hand, an examination of the policy goal.102 
According to the AB, the measure should not be ‘disproportionately wide in its scope 
and reach in relation to the policy objective’, and the ‘means’ should be ‘reasonably 
related to the ends’.103 Moreover, in US — Shrimp, the AB held that the measure was 
‘not a simple, blanket prohibition on the importation of shrimp imposed without regard 
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to the consequences (or lack thereof) of the mode of harvesting employed’.104 When 
applying this condition to the Timber Regulation, it should be restated that the 
preamble clearly indicates that illegal logging contributes to deforestation and forest 
degradation and undermines sustainable forest management and development.105 It 
appears that the structure of the measure is aimed primarily at the protection of 
forests without being disproportionately wide. There is no blanket ban on wood 
imports and it seems that banning illegally logged timber is reasonably related to the 
means. As the Timber Regulation does not impose a definition of legality but rather 
points back at domestic laws related to timber, and not just any law, it also has regard 
for different modes of harvesting. 
 
Second, the measure must be ‘made effective in conjunction with restrictions on 
domestic production or consumption’. This condition aims to ensure evenhandedness 
in the application of an otherwise GATT-inconsistent measure; although no identical 
treatment is required, the measure should not place limitations only on foreign 
products. 106  In other words, the ‘trade restriction must operate jointly with the 
restrictions on domestic production or consumption’, although it is not required that 
the trade restrictive measure is aimed at ensuring the effectiveness of the domestic 
restrictions.107 Considering that the Timber Regulation applies in the same way to 
domestic and foreign illegally logged timber and timber products, this condition 
appears to be fulfilled. 
 
(iv) Article XX: Chapeau 
 
As stated, an otherwise GATT-inconsistent measure covered by one of the policy 
exceptions of Article XX GATT must also satisfy the conditions of the chapeau of this 
provision, which aims to prevent abuse of the exceptions.108 For that reason, the 
chapeau requires that in the application of the measure—hence the chapeau only 
evaluates how the measure is applied—(i) there may be no arbitrary discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, (ii) there may be no 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, and 
(iii) the measure may not constitute a disguised restriction on international trade.109 
Before addressing the compliance of the Timber Regulation with these three 
conditions, it must be noted that the term ‘countries where the same conditions 
prevail’ has been interpreted broadly by the AB as not only including other exporting 
countries but also including the importing country, independent of differences in trade 
volumes among exporting countries.110 Consequently, in the case at hand, the Timber 
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Regulation must apply to all timber exporting countries and the EU itself without 
constituting a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination. 
 
The first two conditions have been assessed both together and separately. Although, 
as we have argued, the treatment of timber which is governed by Article 3 of the 
Timber Regulation (i.e. timber covered by FLEGT or CITES) is discriminatory vis-à-vis 
other timber, it must be stressed that, logically, the discrimination test under the 
chapeau requires more than what is necessary to violate Article III GATT.111 First, in 
this respect, the AB held in US — Shrimp that other WTO Members cannot be 
required to adopt an identical regulatory program to the one issued by the responding 
Member; hence, the different conditions in different Members must be taken into 
account.112 Second, in Brazil — Retreaded Tyres, the AB held that: 
‘discrimination can result from a rational decision or behaviour, and still be 
"arbitrary or unjustifiable", because it is explained by a rationale that bears no 
relationship to the objective of a measure provisionally justified under one of 
the paragraphs of Article XX, or goes against that objective.’113 
Thirdly, the AB has held that a WTO Member is ‘expected to make good faith efforts 
to reach international agreements that are comparable from one forum of negotiation 
to the other.’114  
 
With regard to the first point raised, it must be reiterated that the Timber Regulation 
refers back to domestic laws for the conditions of timber legality. In this respect, the 
measure under scrutiny in US — Shrimp was, in its application:  
‘in effect, an economic embargo which requires all other exporting Members, if 
they wish to exercise their GATT rights, to adopt essentially the same 
policy’.115  
By making the question of legality subject to domestic laws, it seems that, indeed, the 
EU has fulfilled the condition set out by the AB. Hence, the Timber Regulation is likely 
to pass this test.116  As concerns the second point raised, there appears to be a 
rationale that is clearly related to the objective of Articles XX(b) and (g) GATT, 
although it may be questioned whether this is the case for Article XX(d) GATT as well. 
Regarding the third point, as the VPAs essentially require more from the partners than 
the Timber Regulation does, it would appear that in this respect the EU has not 
violated this condition. Furthermore, the inclusion of timber is consistent with the 
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Wildlife Regulation, which refers back to the multilateral CITES agreement, since an 
exception to the Timber Regulation leads to the same conclusion.   
 
Exceptions to a contested measure may spark inconsistency with this condition if they 
differentiate between countries on a basis unrelated to the purpose of the measure.117 
Hence, Article 3 Timber Regulation must be taken into account. As stated supra, this 
provision considers to have been legally harvested certain timber which either 
originates in VPA partners and is consistent with the FLEGT Regulation, or timber of 
species listed in Annex A, B, or C to the Wildlife Regulation. Two issues appear to be 
relevant. First, considering the fact that VPAs, in conjunction with the FLEGT 
Regulation, pursue an objective similar to that of the Timber Regulation, there 
appears to be no issue.118 The exclusion of such timber from the application of this 
regulation merely serves to encourage countries to enter into VPAs, which appear to 
go further than the Timber Regulation, The same can be said for timber which is listed 
in Annexes A to C of the Wildlife Regulation. In this case, at the very least an import 
notification and an export permit are required.119 Second, different legality conditions 
under the Timber Regulation, the VPA scheme, and the Wildlife Regulation may 
cause concern.120 The conditions of legality under the VPA scheme are very similar to 
that under the Timber Regulation and are not an issue.121 However, under the Wildlife 
Regulation, timber can be imported when, as concerns legality, it is not obtained in 
violation of the national legislation on the conservation of the species.122 Hence, a 
more relaxed legal standard applies. This issue is the most pressing for species listed 
in Appendix III to CITES, as parties may unilaterally add timber to this appendix and 
when the party adds no reservations, the exception of Article 3 Timber Regulation 
comes into play. Considering these two elements together, it is possible that a Panel 
finds that the Timber Regulation discriminates on an arbitrary or unjustifiable basis. 
Nonetheless, it must be stressed that the situation at hand is very different from the 
one in US — Gasoline, US — Shrimp, and Brazil — Retreaded Tyres. The 
discrimination is clearly and rationally connected to the relevant policy objectives of 
Article XX GATT. In our opinion, the discrimination results from the fact that the 
                                                     
117
 Appellate Body Report, US — Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, 29; Appellate Body Report, Brazil — 
Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R, paras 227-228. 
118
 See, for example, Voluntary Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of 
Cameroon on forest law enforcement, governance and trade in timber and derived products to the 
European Union (FLEGT) [2011] OJ L92/4 (Cameroon VPA), arts 7-10 and Annex II. 
119
 It has been argued that timber species which are listed in CITES Appendix III by a country can be 
exported to the EU by another country, which has not listed the species in this appendix, and still benefit 
from the exception in Article 3. This was addressed as a loophole because a party to CITES can make 
unilateral changes to Appendix III. See R Cooney, S van Meibom and C H Keong, ‘Trading Timbers: A 
Comparison of Import Requirements under CITES, FLEGT and Related EU Legislation for Timber 
Species in Trade’ (TRAFFIC/WWF, 2012) 22-24. However, we believe this not to be a correct 
interpretation of Article 3 Timber Regulation, which refers back to Annex C of the Wildlife Regulation. 
There, it is stated that Annex C contains the species listed in Appendix III to CITES for which EU Member 
States have not made a reservation. However, listings in Appendix III to CITES are always linked to a 
country (e.g. ‘Diospyros analamerensis (Madagascar)’). Moreover, Article II CITES states that ‘Appendix 
III shall include all species which any Party identifies as being subject to regulation within its jurisdiction 
for the purpose of preventing or restricting exploitation’. Hence, we argue that the interpretation by 
Cooney, van Meibom, and Keong is contrary to the objectives and principles of CITES, the Wildlife 
Regulation, and the Timber Regulation. Nonetheless, if a Panel were to examine the Timber Regulation, 
this matter is likely to be examined from a practical perspective. 
120
 R Cooney, S van Meibom and C H Keong, ‘Trading Timbers: A Comparison of Import Requirements 
under CITES, FLEGT and Related EU Legislation for Timber Species in Trade’ (TRAFFIC/WWF, 2012) 
22-24. 
121
 Annex VIII Cameroon VPA, art I. 
122
 Wildlife Regulation, arts 4.1(b)(i), 4.2(c), and 4.3(a).  
23 
 
complex issue at hand requires multiple policy instruments at several levels in order to 
be WTO compliant. The existing constellation of CITES, VPAs and the Timber 
Regulation illustrates this. In this regard, it should be pointed out that the AB noted:  
‘We recognize that certain complex public health or environmental problems 
may be tackled only with a comprehensive policy comprising a multiplicity of 
interacting measures.’123 
 
The third condition of the chapeau requires that the application of the measure contain 
‘no disguised restriction on international trade’. This condition entails that the measure 
should not be applied in a disguised discriminatory manner, and embraces:  
‘restrictions amounting to arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination in 
international trade taken under the guise of a measure formally within the 
terms of an exception listed in Article XX.’124 
Moreover, the AB held that the same considerations that led to the decision whether 
the measure discriminates in an arbitrary or unjustifiable manner may be taken into 
account in assessing whether it is a disguised restriction on trade.125 Although factual 
evidence by a complainant may provide some evidence to suggest the contrary, we 
do not see how the Timber Regulation could be a disguised barrier to trade. 
 
2. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
 
Product safety standards and other technical regulations vary from country to country. 
The WTO’s TBT Agreement aims to ensure that technical regulations and product 
standards do not create unnecessary obstacles to trade, whilst also ensuring that 
WTO Members maintain their regulatory autonomy and are free to pursue other 
societal objectives, such as the protection of human health and safety and the 
environment.  
 
The TBT Agreement applies to ‘technical regulations’, which according to Annex 1.1 is 
a: 
‘document which lays down product characteristics or their related processes 
and production methods, including the applicable administrative provisions, 
with which compliance is mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively 
with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as 
they apply to a product, process or production method.’  
Therefore an assessment has to be made as to whether Regulation 995/2010: (i) 
applies to an ‘identifiable’ product or a group of products, (ii) ‘lays down’ product 
characteristics or related processes and production methods, and (iii) qualifies as 
‘mandatory’.  
 
First, the Timber Regulation specifies that it apply to ‘timber and timber products’ that 
are specifically identified by the Annex to the Timber Regulation. Therefore, we can 
assume that it applies to a sufficiently identifiable group of products. The second 
question is whether the Timber Regulation ‘lays down’ product characteristics or 
related processes and production methods. In this respect the Regulation is very 
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much akin to the Australian Illegal Logging Prohibition Bill, which similarly only 
distinguishes between timber that has been logged legally and timber that has been 
logged illegally according to the legislation applicable in the country of harvest. With 
respect to that Bill, Mitchell and Ayres note: 
‘…legality itself is not a ‘process or production method’, particularly as legal 
requirements will vary from country to country. Moreover, the legality of the 
way in which timber is harvested is not a ‘related’ non-physical characteristic 
because it does not relate to ‘the means of identification, the presentation or 
the appearance’ of the product.’126 
On this basis, we conclude that the Timber Regulation does not lay down technical 
regulations, and that therefore the TBT Agreement is not applicable to it.  
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we have examined the WTO-consistency of the European Union’s 
Timber Regulation. The Regulation is the most recent contribution to the existing 
international regulatory framework on forestry governance. Some authors have 
questioned the WTO-consistency of both the U.S. Lacey Act and the Australian Illegal 
Logging Prohibition Bill. Similar to these examples, the aim of the Timber Regulation 
is to address the problem of illegal logging by introducing a prohibition on the 
marketing of illegally logged timber. The Regulation does not lay down any product 
characteristics or process and production methods and is therefore unlikely to fall 
within the scope of the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Technical Barriers 
to Trade. As the Regulation covers goods—timber—it has to fulfill the requirements 
set out by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994. The authors conclude 
that since the Regulation only makes a distinction between legally and illegally 
harvested timber, it does not discriminate between ‘like products’ as there is no 
competitive relationship between these two groups of products. As such, the 
Regulation appears to be consistent with Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT. However, 
the Regulation makes the marketing of illegally logged timber a criminal offence and 
therefore creates a ‘de facto’ restriction on the importation of timber. Thus, the 
Regulation would most likely constitute a violation of Article XI GATT. The question is, 
however, whether the Regulation constitutes a ‘border measure’ (Article XI) or an 
‘internal measure’ (Article III:4). Since the Regulation applies equally to both domestic 
and imported products, it is likely that it would be an internal measure and as such 
would be analyzed under Article III:4. Even if a violation of one of the substantive 
provisions of GATT 1994 were to be found by a panel, we conclude that the 
Regulation can most likely be justified based on Article XX GATT. Although several 
legal questions (as noted, questions on trade in illicit goods, likeness between legal 
and illegal goods, a potential disparate impact and hence de facto discrimination 
resulting from the due diligence requirements) remain unanswered, this paper’s 
theoretical analysis shows that the regulatory approach taken by the EU with the 
Timber Regulation may well become an important technique to use the EU internal 
market as leverage for achieving non-trade objectives. 
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